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HOPS, SKIPS AND JUMPS INTO
ADMIRALTY REVISITEDt
On July 28, 1968, a jet aircraft owned and operated by petitioners, struck a flock of seagulls seconds after taking off from Burke
Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, Ohio. The aircraft was departing
on a charter flight to Portland, Maine where it was to pick up passengers and continue on to White Plains, New York. The seagulls,
flushed from the runway by the jet as it became airborne, ascended
into the airspace directly ahead of the plane and over the runway.
Ingestion of the birds into the aircraft's engines resulted in an immediate and substantial loss of power. Descending while still over
land, the plane struck a portion of the airport perimeter fence and
the top of a pickup truck before settling in Lake Erie less than
one-fifth of a statute mile from shore. While no one was killed or
injured, the jet, as a result of its soaking in the waters of Lake
Erie, was a total loss.'
The petitioners, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction brought
a damage suit in the Northern District of Ohio against the air
traffic controller, the City of Cleveland as owner and operator of
the airport and against the airport manager The complaint alleged
that the loss of the aircraft resulted from the respondents' negligent
failure to keep the runway clear of the gulls or give adequate warning of their presence.
In an unreported decision, the district court dismissed the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court held that two
criteria must be met in order to invoke federal admiralty tort juristSee 38 J. Ant L. & COM. 53 (1972).
1This factual situation gave rise to the damage suit in Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1971) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the

courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
'The petitioners also brought a separate suit against the United States as the
air traffic controller's employer under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ §1346(b), 2674 claiming negligence. That action is pending in the District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, 409 U.S. at 251 n.3.
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diction: (i) the locality where the alleged tortious wrong occurred
must have been on navigable waters (the locality test); and (ii)
there must have been a relationship between the wrong and some
maritime service, navigation or commerce on navigable waters (the
maritime nexus test).' It ruled that neither criterion had been satisfied.
In affirming the decision,5 the court of appeals held that since
the alleged tort had occurred on land before the plane reached the
waters of Lake Erie, there was no maritime "locality."' It, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider whether a maritime nexus
was required or satisfied.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari
For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Stewart held, affirming:
"In the absence of legislation to the contrary, there is no federal
admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims arising from flights
by land-based aircraft between points within the continental United
States."' The Supreme Court reached this result by finding that in
aviation crashes a "locality plus maritime nexus" test must be
satisfied in order to ground admiralty tort jurisdiction. Maritime
locality alone being insufficient, the alleged wrong must also bear
a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity." The
Court rejected the option of affirming the trial courts' decisions on
the basis of no maritime locality as the Court of Appeals did; had
the Court exercised this option, they would have been able to avoid
the question of what is the appropriate test for applying admiralty
jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
make its first definitive pronouncement on this long-standing controversy." Though traditionally accepted as the determining factor,
the exclusivity of the locality test had long been open to doubt 1 and
'409 U.S. at 251.
'448 F.2d 151 (1971).
Old. at 154-55.
' Id. The single dissenter, without advocating the adoption of a "locality plus
nexus" test, felt that a sufficient maritime nexus existed when an aircraft crashed
into navigable waters, even if the negligent conduct was alleged to have occurred
wholly on land. Id. at 163.

-405 U.S. 915 (1972).
910409 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 268.

l Id. at 258.
" In 1850, Judge Benedict first questioned whether marine locality was enough
or that some relationship of the parties to the ship may also be necessary. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY,

173 (1850).
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had evoked considerable criticism" and confusion. The Court in
Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, felt the
uncertainty had survived long enough.' In so doing, while holding
that an intracontinental flight of a land based aircraft would not
give rise to a sufficient maritime nexus, the Court refused to shed
much light upon the question of what would." Intent on firmly
establishing and explaining the need for a maritime nexus in the
test for jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not reach the question
of locality since it found there to be no sufficient maritime nexus.
The decision in Executive Jet is an attempt to harmonize and
rationalize the relationship of admiralty law to aircraft and to dispell the notion that locality is the exclusive test for admiralty tort
jurisdiction. Executive Jet's recognition of "locality plus" as the
appropriate test is a sound decision and can be sustained by both
constitutional analysis and a study of previous case law. Though
the influence of this case on admiralty law will be substantial, its
precise effect is somewhat muddied by the Court's failure to come
to grips with what constituted a sufficient maritime nexus. Also,
while this decision represents a step in the right direction, it still
leaves room for the application of admiralty jurisdiction to aviation
mishaps under certain circumstances. Because this possibility still
exists, Congress should move to exclude all aircraft cases from
admiralty cognizance.
I. ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION AND THE CONSTITUTION

While the Supreme Court in Executive Jet neither refers to nor
explicitly relies on the Constitution in rendering its decision, its
ruling is strengthened and sanctioned by constitutional analysis.
"aSee, e.g., 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 325[3],[5] (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions,
50 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 264 (1950).
" The Supreme Court, though possessing ample opportunity to do so, preferred to avoid the issue on previous occasions. In Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914), a case involving a longshoreman injured on a vessel, the Court skirted the issue of the exclusivity of locality by remarking that
even if more than locality was required, sufficient maritime nexus was also present in the case. Id. at 61, 62. Similarly, after the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (1963) had
ruled that locality alone was sufficient to ground admiralty tort jurisdiction when
air planes crashed on navigable waters, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
375 U.S. 940 (1963).
"s409 F.2d at 272.
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This analysis supports the proposition that "locality plus" is the
appropriate test for all admiralty tort jurisdiction cases, not just
cases involving aircraft.
Article III, section two of the Constitution declares that "[t]he
Judicial Power of the United States shall extend to . . . all cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Mr. Justice Story early
suggested that this constitutional grant be liberally construed to
encompass all that was included in the laws of ancient France,
England and the other maritime nations of Europe and the Mediterranean. 6 During these early times, the sole test for both contract
and tort jurisdiction in England as well as on the continent was
the maritime nature of the dispute. Exercising the power given
to it in the "necessary and proper" clause of article I, section eight,
congress implemented the Constitution by passage of the statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.1 Although seemingly
phrased in as broad a language as its constitutional counterpart, the
statutory grant has required specific legislative action to extend the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts to the outer boundaries
of the constitutional grant."9 Thus, the constitutional provision can
be viewed as designating the extent to which admiralty jurisdiction
potentially could be exercised by the federal courts, while the statutory grant, in conjunction with other special legislative acts, gives
rise to the present legislative determination, as interpreted by the
courts, regarding that which should be so exercised. While outer
perimeters of the statutory grant are limited to the outer boundaries
of the constitutional concept, the spheres of jurisdiction created by
the two grants need not necessarily be coterminous.
The only test for admiralty tort jurisdiction required by the Constitution is a maritime nexus. As discussed above, the constitutional
concept of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is derived from the
ancient French and English admiralty courts whose only criterion
for both contract and tort jurisdiction was the maritime nature of
the dispute."0 If this was the test for these courts, it follows that it
is also the appropriate constitutional test. The soundness of this
16

DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 419 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).

1725 HARv. L.
"28 U.S.C. §
1977 HARV. L.
21 See note 14

REV. 381 (1912).
1333(1), quoted note 2 supra.
REV. 545 (1964).
supra.
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logic is supported by recognition of the fact that various congressional acts have extended admiralty cognizance to situations that
lacked any maritime locality, but did possess sufficient connection

to the subject matter with which admiralty was concerned. Despite
the lack of a maritime locality, these acts have all been accepted

by the courts as constitutional. The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act,2 for example, expands admiralty jurisdiction to cover
torts caused by a vessel although consumated on shore. Under these

circumstances, no marine locality is present for the tort "occurs"
on land." Notwithstanding the absence of a maritime locality, the
statute declares that connection with the vessel constitutes a sufficient maritime nexus to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. If the con-

stitutional test contained a locality requirement, the Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act would be struck down as including
within admiralty torts outside the constitutional scope. The courts
however, have consistently upheld the constitutionaliy of the Act.2 '
Under European admiralty law, amphibious torts were actionable
in the maritime courts." American courts have viewed the Constitution as allowing for the same. 5 Locality then comprises no part of
the constitutional test.
If maritime "nexus only" represents the constitutional test, then
any statutory test, at the very least, must contain nexus also. The

latter cannot allow into admiralty an action that cannot pass con2146 U.S.C. 5 740 (1971) provides:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to a person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consumated on land.
22
The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 20, 35 (1866), accord, Smith & Son v.
Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928), Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935). Although the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act overrules the result in The Plymouth, it has no effect on the latter's internal logic.
23 United States v. Matson Nay. Co., 201 F.2d 610, 614-16 (9th Cir. 1953);
American Bridge Co. v. The Gloria 0, 98 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Fematt
v. City of Los Angeles, Cal., 196 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
11201
F.2d at 615.
2
5As the Court points out other legislative acts have been construed to require a relationship to maritime service, commerce or navigation. 409 U.S. at
259-60. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, 318 U.S. 36
(1943) applying Jones Act to seamen injured on land by drawing analogy to
similar treatment of the concept of maintenance and cure; Gutierrez v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) extending the doctrine of unseaworthiness
to a seaman or longshoreman to recover for injuries sustained wholly on land if
caused by defects in a ship or the ship's gear; it may be argued contra that these
cases were more concerned with the status of seamen than with tort jurisdiction.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

stitutional muster. The statutory test, however, may require more
by incorporating additional limiting criteria and exclude some
actions that would otherwise pass the broad constiutional test.
Locality is a limitation of this kind."6 When used in the statutory
context, the maritime locality test serves to restrict the grant of
jurisdiction that could potentially be given, not to expand it to
action not within the constitutional concept. A court that theorized
in terms of "locality only" would have to apply a maritime connection criterion sub silentio in order to conform to the Constitution.27
In establishing a "locality plus" test in Executive Jet, the Supreme
Court is not constructing a constitutional standard. Rather, it is
announcing a test designed to identify that which the legislature
thought should be entertained within admiralty today, not what
constitutionally could be. Waging a constitutional argument against
the application of admiralty jurisdiction to an aircraft crashing on
navigable waters would be very difficult given the accepted constitutional of the Death of the High Seas Act 8 as applied to
aerial mishaps occuring beyond territorial waters." The mechanism
employed in determining what is within this statutory grant, is the
"locality plus" test.

II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF "LOCALITY ONLY"

In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court did not rely on overt constitutional analysis in reaching its decision. Instead, it merely concluded that no definitive test had been enunciated by the High
Court, and thus, it was free to devise an appropriate test. In making
this decision, an important consideration of the Court was an examination of previous case law.
The early American decisions, though looking to the English law
for guidance, did not feel constrained to always follow it. As England developed into a great seapower, the authority of its admiralty
courts increased correspondingly. The expansion of this influence
28See

McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

27 Comment, 64 COLUM. L. REV.

1085, 1091 (1964); this theory is discussed
infra p. 11.
2846 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1971).
28409 U.S. at 274 n.26; 77 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1964). See, e.g., D'Aleman

v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958); Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Notarian v. Transworld
Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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heightened the jealousy of the common law courts for their brethren
in admiralty. The common law courts, after protracted strife and
struggle, managed to place restrictions on the admiralty's scope of
operations. Geographic in nature, these limitations restricted admiralty jurisdiction to disputes occurring upon the high seas."0 The
United States, however, not to be constricted by the peculiarities of
the English experience, turned to the principles then in practice in
the civil law countries. In DeLovio v. Boit,'1 Mr. Justice Story rejected the application of English jurisdictional limitations in holding that contracts of martime insurance, although entered into on
land, were within admiralty jurisdiction. In referring to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to admiralty courts he remarked:
If we examine the etymology, or received use of the words "admiralty" and "maritime jurisdiction," we shall find, that they include jurisdiction of all things done upon and relating to the sea,
or, in other words, all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the sea."2
As for the statutory grant of jurisdiction, he declared:
[T]he delegation of cognizance of "all civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" to the courts of the United States comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch
is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends over all
contracts ... which relate to the navigation, business or commerce
of the sea."
In Story's view, American admiralty was to be a subject matter
jurisdiction, rather than a geographical one when maritime contracts were at issue." This position is consonant with the concept
that the purpose of admiralty law is to regulate and achieve uniformity in the area of maritime commerce.' Tort jurisdiction may
30See generally, GILMORE & BLACK. THE LAw OF ADMIALTY, ch.1 (1957)

[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
31 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776)
33

(C.C.D. Mass. 1815).

/d. at 441.
3
I at 444 (emphasis added).
1d.
34
A contra interpretation is that this subject matter concept only extended
to contracts, not to torts. Story's language is susceptible to this interpretation.
Indeed some early writers subscribed to the belief that the theory of "locality
plus" originated from an erroneous application of the contract test to tort cases.
16 HARV. L. REV. (1903).
3564 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1964).
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be further bounded by locality, but this predicate may be construed
as a limitation on the subject matter, not a substitute for it.
The Supreme Court adopted the English geographical limitation
on tort jurisdiction in The Plymouth." Owing to the negligence of
those in charge of the steamship Falcon, the vessel caught fire. The
flames leaping from the ship to the adjoining wharf, set the pier
and its warehouses on fire. As a consequence, stores in the houses
were destroyed. The Court held that no jurisdiction lay in admiralty
since the entire damage occurred on land:
Dependent upon locality, the jurisdiction is limited to the sea or
navigable waters not extending beyond the high-water mark ....
The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact
that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the localitythe high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every species
of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not,
if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance."
Focusing myopically on this last sentence, most courts interpreted
The Plymouth as firmly establishing the "locality only" test. More
recently, however, McGuire v. City of New York advocated that a
closer reading of The Plymouth would indicate that locality served
as a limitation on the exercised jurisdiction, not as the sole criterion
upon which to expand jurisdiction to all torts consumated on navigable waters irrespective of their connection with traditional maritime activity.' Indeed, the Court in Executive Jet agreed that "despite the broad language of cases like The Plymouth, supra, the
fact is that this Court has never emphatically held that a maritime
locality is the sole test of admiralty tort jurisdiction."'
To interpret The Plymouth or DeLovio as calling for locality as
the sole factor and so to apply them did not spawn unsavory results
in the great majority of instances. When a "locality only" test was
applied to contract cases, its inappropriateness was easily discernable; when applied to tort cases, however, the practical results did
not prove unsatisfactory. There seemed no reason to re-examine the
issue. As the Supreme Court in Executive Set recognized, in the
6 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 20 (1866).
37Id. at 33.
3Iid. at 36.
"9192 F. Supp. at 869.
40 409 U.S. at 258.
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early era it was difficult to conceive of a tortious occurrance on
navigable waters other than in connection with a vessel or traditional maritime commercial activity.' Because a maritime link was
always present, the courts tended to overlook its significance; because it was always present, this neglect could pass unnoticed.
While the majority of courts did speak exclusively in terms of
locality, most of the cases adjudicated through application of this
test would also have satisfied a "locality plus" requirement. ' Thus,
though not often verbalized, maritime nexus appears to have been
a condition sub silentio.
While the application of "locality only" to the traditional types
of maritime torts may have produced acceptible results, this was
not the case when it was applied to boarderline marine situations.
In The Blackheath,' it was held that admiralty had jurisdiction of
a libel in rem against a vessel for damages caused by its negligently
running into a beacon in a channel. Though the beacon was attached to the ocean bottom, the court in the Blackheath looked to a
maritime nexus to bring the action within the cognizance of admiralty, branding the beacon an aid to navigation. The Plymouth
was distinguished on the grounds that there was "nothing maritime
in the nature of the tort for which the vessel was attached. The fire
lacked a maritime flavor. ''" In the subsequent decisions involving
aids to navigation attached to the land, the courts looked beyond
the mere location of the object and instead sought to determine its
purpose. ' Courts were forced to begin to question the exclusivity
of locality.
Cases involving injured swimmers, produced full scale abandonment of "locality only" by many courts. Thus, in McGuire v. City
of New York when a bather struck a submerged piling at a public
41Id.

at 254.

192 F. Supp. at 868 n.3; 64 COLUM. L. REV. at 1088.
195 U.S. 361 (1904).
44Id.

at 367.

423 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 345, 349 (1966). This groping for the purpose of
the object is exemplified by the cases in which submarine cables used for communication were held not to be a structure on the land or affixed thereto and
thus within admiralty jurisdiction, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. P. Sanford Ross,
Inc., 221 F. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), while cables deployed solely to carry electric
current were considered land structures and thus without admiralty cognizance
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Karsha v. Great Western Power Co., 17 F.2d 239 (9th
Cir. 1927).
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beach, the district court ruled that the fact that a tort occurred on
navigable waters was merely a prima facie test of admiralty jurisdiction. ' Accordingly in Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms"
the Sixth Circuit recognized:
A relationship must exist between the wrong and some maritime
service, navigation or commerce on navigable waters. Absent such
a relationship, admiralty jurisdiction would depend entirely upon
the fact that a tort occurred on navigable waters, a fact which in
and of itself, in light of the historic justification for federal admiralty jurisdiction is quite immaterial to any meaningful invocation of the jurisdiction of admiralty courts."
The Court in Executive Jet was aware that the courts applying
the maritime nexus factor obtained more rational results while the
courts that blindly applied "locality only" to similar situations achieved absurd results justified only by tortured logic. In Davis v.
City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla., for example, the district court
felt constrained to defend its position by classifying a surfboard as
possessing a potential to interfere with trade or commerce.' This
suspect reasoning was abandoned in Rodrique v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co." In this case, the Supreme Court refused to hold the
Death on the High Seas Act applicable to accidents arising on
drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico because the accidents bore
no relation to the traditional concerns of admiralty.'
The Court in Executive Jet recognized that aircraft cases were
border line situations in which application of "locality only" produced unsatisfactory results. As in the cases involving swimmers, a
maritime connection could not always be assumed to be present in
aviation tort actions. Nevertheless, courts had traditionally ignored
the nexus aspect of the issue and applied admiralty law to aviation
torts occuring on or over navigable waters. Thus, not only were
deaths caused by crashes upon the high seas cognizable under the
" 192 F. Supp. at 870.

47385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). A swimmer was injured when he dove from
a pier into eighteen inches of water.
48 Id. at 966.
49
Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla., 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (injury to a swimmer by a surfboard).

U.S. 352 (1969).
"Id. at 360.
50395
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Death on the High Seas Act,52 but so too were actions for personal
injuries arising out of these crashes." In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., " when a jetliner crashed into Boston Harbor shortly
after takeoff, claims for wrongful death were granted admiralty
jurisdiction while those involving breach of contract and warranty
were not. In reaching that decision the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit rejected the concept of "locality plus", and instead,
relied exclusively on locality. However justified it argued its position to be, the court in Weinstein was not so confident that it could
resist assuring the parties that, in its opinion, "locality plus" was
satisfied also.'
In handing down its decision in Executive Jet, the Supreme Court
overruled Weinstein in both reasoning and result. Unlike a ship, an
airplane is not confined to the boundaries of the sea; its crashing
into the ocean is wholly fortuitous. The requirement that the wrong
show a relationship to traditional maritime activity serves as a protection against that fortuity becoming operative.
The argument that the holding of "locality plus" in Executive
Jet should be restricted in its application to aviation torts must be
rebutted. Quite apart from the constitutional analysis offered earlier,
this interpretation of Executive Jet is far too parochial. That this
decision represents the first time the Supreme Court has chosen to
explicitly state what is the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction adds
clout to the effect the ruling will have. The context in which it
necessarily had to work was an aviation tort. The issue was likely
to arrive at the Supreme Court within the confines of a "borderline" case that involved airplanes or swimmers because, as we have
seen, more traditional maritime situations would have been resolved satisfactorily, their maritime nexus being inherent in the instrumentality involved. The Court's protracted discussion of the
development of admiralty tort jurisdiction, however, and its approval of the tests laid out in McGuire and Chapman would seem
to indicate that the Court was resolving an issue whose impact
12

See, e.g., Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483

(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Cf. D'Aleman v. Pan-American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493
(2d Cir. 1958).
"8 See, e.g., Bergeron v. Aero Associates, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La.
1953); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).

-316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
51 Id. at 763.
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went far beyond airplane crashes in territorial waters. The Court in
Executive Jet has decreed that that which was a condition sub
silentio in traditional maritime decisions should be dormant no
longer and that the maritime nexus should henceforth be a condition expressio. "It is far more consistent with the history and purbear a significant
pose of admiralty to require . . . that the wrong
'5
activity.'
maritime
traditional
to
relationship
III. SUFFICIENT NEXUS

After establishing "locality plus" as the applicable test, the Supreme Court in Executive Jet concluded that a land-based aircraft
on an intracontinental flight did not reflect a significant enough relationship to traditional maritime activity to satisfy the nexus requirement. The Court, however, refused to define what would constitute a sufficient nexus. It did hint that a transoceanic flight would
comprise an ample nexus since in this situation the aircraft would
be "performing a function traditionally performed by a waterborne
vessel." The problem with the validity of this concept is that the
function is being performed in an entirely different medium-the
atmosphere above the earth. The only time an airplane comes into
contact with the sea is when it fails to function properly. The characteristics of this medium and of the "ships" that operate in it bear
little resemblance to those concerns admiralty law was designed to
remedy. The above mentioned phrase, however, in addition to the
requirement that the wrong should "bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity" 8 are the only guidelines given by
the Court."0 Applying these criteria to the cases like Hornsby v.
The Fishmeal Co.," where two planes serving as spotters for fishing
vessels collided within a state's territorial limits, it would appear
admiralty jurisdiction may be retained in some aviation-maritime
situations. In Hornsby, the pilots were performing duties ordinarily
performed by men in water vessels and were actively engaged in
the traditional marine business of fishing. Similarly, the derigible
51409 U.S. at 268.
57
Id.at 271.
"IId.at 268.
11It has been suggested that contract standards could be used. 44 TUL. L.
REv. 166, 172 (1969).
60431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
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involved in Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." would
remain within the confines of admiralty because it was to be used
primarily over water.
The precise effect that Executive Jet will have on future plaintiffs asserting admiralty jurisdiction will depend largely on what
future courts will require as a significant maritime nexus. One class
of plaintiffs that will have to face this problem will be those involved
in water recreation accidents. Given the Supreme Court's emphasis
on traditional maritime activity and commerce, the occurrence on
water of a tort, even if involving a "vessel," may not be enough to
invoke admiralty jurisdiction.
In the past, a water skier, surfer or other water sport enthusiast,
if he received an injury on navigable waters, was in a relatively
strong position to claim admiralty jurisdiction. As recently as in
King v. Testerman,' when a water skier was injured, the district
court reluctantly felt compelled to grant admiralty jurisdiction:
The concurrence of the use of a boat in connection with the accident and the fact that it occurred on navigable waters constrains
the Court to the belief that admiralty jurisdiction is thereby established. But the matter is by no means free from doubt."'
The result is even more doubtful today. In Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Florida," a swimmer sustained injuries when struck
by a surfboard. Although ruling that admiralty could entertain the
suit because of the locality of the tort, the district court believed
the maritime nexus requirement would also be satisfied since the
surfboard could be analogized to a raft or a canoe. Neither a
twenty-three foot Owens Craft Cruiser nor a surfboard bear a
relationship to the traditional maritime activity admiralty law was
created to regulate. Their sole raison d'etre is to afford recreational
enjoyment to their users. The similarities between pleasure craft
on navigable waters and those on waters not so designated are
greater than the similarities between pleasure craft on navigable
waters and commercial vessels. Yet, in the absence of a requirement of a relationship to traditional commercial maritime activity,
pleasure craft used on navigable water will be subject to ad6"231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
6 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).

08 1d. at 336.
"See note 49 supra.
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miralty law, while pleasure craft on nonnavigable water are governed by different substantive rules. Under Executive Jet this relationship is required and recreation cases can be expected to be
thrown back into the state courts where they belong.' It often has
been erroneously contended that "nothing is more maritime than
the Sea."" This statement fails to recognize the basic fact that the

primary concern of admiralty is not the sea but the uniform regulation of seagoing commerce. Our federal courts are burdened enough
without having to hear the case of every disgruntled swimmer, skier
or Sunday skipper."
IV. AIRPLANES AND ADMIRALTY
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet allowed for the possibility

that aircraft engaged in transoceanic flights would be within admiralty jurisdiction largely because it feared that choice of law and
forum problems and international legal difficulties involving multination conventions and treaties would arise if these types of flights
were withdrawn from admiralty cognizance." While not unfounded," these considerations should not stand in the way of excluding
all aircraft from admiralty jurisdiction irrespective of any functional
similarity to ocean carriers. Even if we accept the argument that

aircraft could be brought within admiralty tort jurisdiction, the
better view is that they should not.
Eliminating intracontinental flights from the grasp of admiralty
"Should a pleasure craft interfere with maritime commerce, this interference
could form the basis of a sufficient nexus on which to ground admiralty jurisdiction. The inequities that exist when pleasure craft cases are allowed into admiralty are illustrated by the situation of negligent operation of a speedboat resuiting in injuries totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. Through the application of the Limitation on Liability Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1972)), the
negligent owner-operator would be held accountable only for the amount representing the value of his "vessel" at the end of its journey, perhaps as little as a
couple of hundred dollars. The purpose of the Act, to encourage investment in
American ship building, is inapplicable to this owner.
"See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 65 n.6 (5th Cir. 1961); 316
F.2d at 762.
17 Cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts 233 (1968).
Is 409 U.S. at 272.

" The choice of law problems are not formidable. In those jurisdictions adopting the contacts approach, the law of the state or nations with the most significant
relationship to the occurrence will apply; in those jurisdictions that retain the lex
loci approach, the substantive laws of admiralty would apply.
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will not eradicate fortuity. Because aircraft are not restricted to
travel over only land or water, even if "locality plus" is applied,
the existence of airplanes will bring chance into play. Assuming
that a transoceanic flight does possess a sufficient maritime nexus,
if that aircraft plunges into Boston Harbor shortly after take off,
an action will be in admiralty for death and injuries resulting therefrom. If that same flight, however, manages to catch the rocks of
Winthrop shore and is thus prevented from reaching the water's
edge, plaintiffs must turn to the common law courts for remedies
and jurisdiction. This is the very fortuity that helped move the
Supreme Court in Executive Jet to action. As long as locality forms
any part of the jurisdictional test, fortuity will remain.
Another situation in which fortuity runs rampant under the principles laid down in Executive Jet is when a landbased aircraft on
a flight between points within the continental United States crashes
outside the territorial limits. According to the Supreme Court, the
Death on the High Seas Act then becomes applicable."0 If the victim dies, his heirs may invoke admiralty; if he lives, the plaintiff
has recourse only to the common law courts. Unification is needed.
Not one that is engineered to satisfy the needs and idiosyncracies
of the commercial maritime industry, but one formulated with the
requirements of aviation in mind.
While parties to aviation tort actions that remain in admiralty
are accorded automatic access to the federal courts and the procedural advantages of admiralty jurisdiction," much of the substantive maritime law has not been applied to aircraft. Thus,
though a downed plane has been held subject to a maritime lien
for salvage," aircraft are not generally subject to maritime liens,"3
70 409 U.S. at 274 n.26.
"IFederal court jurisdiction without the need for diversity dollar amount, or
independent basis of federal jurisdiction; more liberal venue requirements (7A
MOORE 5 66); depositions de bene esse (MooRE, 5 58), broader rights of impleader (Fed. R. Civ. P. 14); the savings to sailors clause (28 U.S.C. § 1333).
7'This conclusion is not clear, however, when a seaplane crashed into navigable waters, it was held no maritime lien for salvage attached. Foss v. Crawford
Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914). Yet, when a seaplane buzzed a ship
and then landed in the water it was ruled that there was a salvage lien. Lambros
Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954). In this latter case,
however, the salvors were denied award on other grounds.
It has been argued that salvage liens should attach because in this situation
the fallen aircraft is in the same position as a ship--either floating helplessly or
sunk. In either instance, its capacity for flight no longer exists. Crenshaw, Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History, 18 S.C.L. REv. 572, 574
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nor the maritime Limitation of Liability Act." Furthermore, airplanes are exempt from the maritime rules of the road under the
Federal Aviation Act"5 and air crews are not deemed seamen within the scope of the Jones Act."6 This recognition by the courts that
application of substantive admiralty rules to aircraft is inapposite
serves as an admission that admiralty was not created to cope with
the kinds of commercial problems that accompany the aviation industry.
The risks and routine encountered by passengers on transoceanic
and intracontinental flights are very similar if not identical. No
corresponding similarities are shared by a transoceanic flyer and
his counterpart on an oceanliner. As admiralty law has developed
to provide a set of rules and principles applicable to the particular
problems of maritime commerce and navigation, so too should a
body of law amenable to the idiosyncracies of the commercial aviation industry be developed. In a piecemeal fashion, Congress has
recognized the special status and problems of airplanes and has enacted considerable legislation directed at this area." Congress should
now complete its task and develop a complete set of laws in harmony with the aviation industry, a body of law the applicability of
which will not be contingent upon the ultimate destination of the
aircraft nor upon the composition of the terrain over which it happens to be flying."
V. CONCLUSION

Executive Jet represents an abrupt overruling of the holding in
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. that crashes of land based aircraft on intracontinental flights are cognizable in admiralty. More(1966); GILMORE & BLACK at 450.
"Foss v. Crawford Bros., No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914); United
States v. Northwest Air. Serv. Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935).
' 4 Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Dollins v. Pan American Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
7549 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1973).
'Marino v. Trawler Emil C. Inc., 350 Mass. 88 (1966). Nor could I find
any cases when air crewmen have invoked admiralty to obtain maintenance and
cure or rely on the doctrine of unseaworthiness, nor have airlines been held to
divided damage or general averaging.
77A
MOORE 5 220[2].
"'See Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential?, 19 J. Am
L. & CoM. 166, 317 (1952) (Pts. 1 & 2).
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over, it has at last established a definitive test for all admiralty tort
jurisdiction. As courts cited Weinstein for the broad proposition
that "locality only" determined admiralty jurisdiction, 9 so now,
courts will recognize Executive Jet as firmly establishing "locality
plus nexus" as the appropriate test for all maritime tort situations.
The Supreme Court expended much effort in an exhaustive discussion of the background and development of admiralty tort jurisdiction and applauded the use of the "locality plus nexus" test by
lower courts in differing fact situations. While the High Court was
working within a factual framework involving aircraft, it did not
restrict itself to aviation case precedents in arriving at its decision.
Similarly, application of "locality plus nexus" as the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction is not to be confined to aircraft accident
cases. The basic soundness of the Supreme Court's holding is supported by both constitutional analysis of the underlying grants of
jurisdiction and a recognition that maritime nexus has always been
a condition sub silentio to invoking that jurisdiction.
The precise, impact that Executive Jet will have on admiralty
will be determined to the greatest extent by what courts will interpret as a sufficient maritime nexus. While the Supreme Court failed
to provide adequate positive guidelines, it still appears that recreational mishaps occurring on navigable waters do not possess the
requisite relationship to traditional maritime activity to ground
admiralty jurisdiction. Adjudication of these cases will be left to
the state courts. This outcome is consonant with the purpose of
admiralty jurisdiction to afford a forum and a uniform set of substantive laws to those parties engaged in traditional commercial
maritime activity. This result is also an acknowledgment of that
principle which Justice Storey recognized early in the development
of this nation's concepts of maritime law-admiralty was created
to serve as a subject matter jurisdiction, not as a geographical one.
While geography may be a limitation on the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is not to be the conclusive sine qua non to its evocation.
Loring A. Cook III

'9 See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. at 328.

